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17 
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL GROTIUS LECTURE 
RESPONSE 
AMARTYA SEN’S VISION FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS – AND WHY HE NEEDS THE LAW 
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE* 
I would like to thank the American Society of International Law 
and the American University Washington College of Law for 
inviting me to be a commentator on the lecture of one of my heroes 
in the intellectual world: Amartya Sen.  This year, the Annual 
Meeting of the American Society for International Law has a 
particularly appropriate Grotius Lecturer.  While Professor Sen and 
Hugo Grotius part company on a number of specific issues, they 
share quite a lot as well. 
Both Professor Sen and Hugo Grotius have ranged widely across 
intellectual fields.  Professor Sen started as an economist and he now 
occupies a prominent place in political philosophy, public policy, 
and law.  Hugo Grotius was trained first as a lawyer, but ranged 
widely over philosophy and religion.  Their perspectives— over the 
tops and around the edges of disciplines, as it were—give their 
writings extraordinary influence and reach.  Each is a public 
intellectual, to use a modern term, and each has combined a 
commitment to public life with the careful tending of the life of the 
mind.   
Both men came of age in times of religious strife and this early 
experience profoundly shaped their work.  Hugo Grotius‘s early 
career fell at a time when Calvinists and Reformers came to blows in 
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his native Holland, as a result of which he spent some time in jail for 
being on the wrong side of the conflict.1  Marked by reaction against 
this intolerance, Grotius kept seeking some point of harmony in a 
religiously divided world.  Professor Sen came of age in India during 
the bloody partition with Pakistan.  He personally witnessed the way 
that religious strife fueled economic deprivation which led to 
violence and then to victimization.  He, too, came face to face with 
religious conflict and became determined to transcend it.  As he 
writes in his Nobel Prize autobiography, first-hand experience with 
the victims of the Muslim-Hindu conflict ―made me aware of the 
dangers of narrowly defined identities.‖2   
Having seen first-hand how religious intolerance could be 
destructive, both Professor Sen and Hugo Grotius devoted substantial 
attention to the question of normativity and its philosophical 
grounding, hoping to find a way out of narrow sectarian justification 
into a realm of reason.  They therefore both want to locate 
normativity in the connection between reasoned argument and its 
relationship to evidence.  Grotius thought that normativity rested in 
the properties of actions—properties that could be discerned through 
―right reason.‖3  Professor Sen argues that normativity rests in the 
degree of freedom that a person possesses, enabling her to concretely 
realize her capabilities.4  Which freedoms should be valued over 
others, Professor Sen tells us, depends on reasoned public debate that 
should be conducted through adopting the perspective of impartial 
objectivity5—different in practice but similar in function to Grotius‘s 
 
 1. See Jon Miller, Hugo Grotius, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (July 28, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/ 
grotius/ (noting that Grotius was a reformer, also known as a ―Remonstrant,‖ who 
was arrested after a ―Contra-Remonstrant‖ coup by orthodox Calvinists). 
 2. Amartya Sen, Autobiography, NOBELPRIZE.ORG,  http://www.nobelprize.or 
g/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1998/sen.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2011). 
 3. See Miller, supra note 2 (―The law of nature is a dictate of right reason 
―which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational 
nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in 
consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined.‖). 
 4. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 231 (2009) [hereinafter SEN, 
IDEA OF JUSTICE] (―[I]ndividual advantage is judged in the capability approach by 
a person‘s capability to do things he or she has reason to value.‖ 
 5. See id. at 42 (―The reasoning that is sought in analyzing the requirements of 
justice will incorporate some basic demands of impartiality . . . .‖). 
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―right reason.‖  Both Professor Sen and Hugo Grotius therefore give 
pride of place to a well-constructed conception of reason in sorting 
out what normative commitments a community should defend.  
Normativity ultimately rests, in both cases, on the results of such 
reasoning rather than on mere processes through which the results 
are reached.6   
Perhaps the most important similarity between the two, however, 
is that Grotius believed that rights consist of the means or powers of 
an individual to do something, as does Professor Sen.7  Rights for 
Grotius were properties of individuals that the individual determined 
whether and how to deploy.8  Grotius therefore identified rights with 
what Professor Sen has called the capabilities of persons.  Of course, 
the early seventeenth century version of this idea is substantially 
different from the early twenty-first century version.  In particular, 
Grotius, like Thomas Hobbes, believed that all individual rights 
could be given up in exchange for protection from a ruler,9 a view 
that Professor Sen would radically challenge.  And Grotius, unlike 
Professor Sen, did not believe in the universality of rights, holding 
instead that some people were naturally inferior and so, for example, 
could be justly kept as slaves.10  It is nonetheless striking how close 
 
 6. See id. at 66-69 (basing an important critique of the work of John Rawls 
precisely on the point that Rawls is too concerned with procedure and institutions, 
and therefore fails to notice whether the results in the world are in fact better for 
the people involved.); see also Miller, supra note 2 (reflecting the different 
preoccupations of his time, Grotius believed that one could derive the basic rules 
of normativity from the observation of nature itself). 
 7. See Miller, supra note 2  (―When we say that no-and-so has the right to 
such-and-such, we usually mean that he has the means or power to do such and 
such . . . . This was Grotius‘ view; though subsequently mediated by others, his 
contribution was essential.‖);  Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human 
Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 328 (2004)(―By starting from the importance of 
freedoms as the appropriate human condition on which to concentrate, rather than 
on utilities (as Bentham did), we get a motivating reason not only for celebrating 
our own rights and liberties, but also for taking an interest in the significant 
freedoms of others. . . .‖. 
 8. See Miller, supra note 2 (―[W]hereas medieval theorists tended to speak of 
‗the right,‘ Grotius and his successors stressed the powers and entitlements of the 
person who has rights.‖). 
 9. See id. (explaining Grotius‘s viewed that rights of individuals could be 
overridden by a ruler ―[b]ecause sovereignty is ‗that power . . .‘ whose actions are 
not subject to the legal control of another‖). 
 10. See id. (detailing how Grotius maintained that individuals could sell their 
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Grotius comes to Professor Sen‘s views about rights as capabilities.   
Finally, both Grotius and Professor Sen have a global vision.  The 
American Society for International Law honors Grotius as the ―father 
of international law‖ for his systematic work on the law of war, the 
theory of states, and the development of the view that the 
international arena can be characterized by the normative 
relationships among states.  Today, our Grotius lecturer, Amartya 
Sen, is honored for his substantial contributions to a just world 
marked by the respect for, and the empowering of, individuals.   
With that background, let us examine the ideas that Amartya Sen 
has brought to us today.  He has given us a very rich conception of 
what it means to have human rights—a conception that is notable for 
focusing on those who are human rights‘ key intended beneficiaries, 
and on the status of their lives, rather than on the institutions, rules, 
and doctrines that are supposed to bring rights into being or provide 
for their maintenance.  The focus on the holders of rights makes 
Professor Sen‘s contribution particularly moving, as the plight of the 
individual—one who has few opportunities and no means to carry 
out the scarce opportunities that she may have—should be at the 
center of our concern.  But, as Professor Sen notes, legal and 
political theory often change the subject from the quality of lives of 
real persons to the characteristics of the rules, principles, and 
institutions that tee up political and legal decisions to be made about 
those lives.11  Against this more formal view, Professor Sen argues 
that restriction of the space of freedom, through closing the windows 
and slamming the doors of opportunity, is a world-wide tragedy to 
which we all must attend.  Human rights create new opportunities 
and provide the means through which people can have better lives.  
As Professor Sen reminds us, it is the potential for better lives that 
we must keep in view.   
As he directs our attention towards those individuals whose rights 
are most fragile and imperfectly guaranteed, however, Professor Sen 
 
liberty, just as they could their labor, and thus, slavery could exist in a just 
society). 
 11. See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 66-74 (critiquing the work of 
John Rawls for placing attention on institutional structures and the logic of just 
rules over direct concern with the lives of disadvantaged people). 
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has a number of skeptical things to say about the role of law in the 
realization of rights.  Since this is a room full of lawyers – and 
international lawyers at that – I will argue that the legal recognition 
and the law-based enforcement of human rights might be of more 
assistance to the urgent mission that Professor Sen has undertaken 
than he recognizes.  Law cannot do everything, it is true, but law is 
more crucial to more aspects of the project of opening the world of 
opportunity to those who are downtrodden than Professor Sen has 
given law credit for.   
In my comments, then, I will address the general skepticism that 
Professor Sen has shown for using law as a crucial tool in the 
struggle for human rights.  Further, I will provide a defense of law as 
an important partner for his enterprise.   
I. 
According to Professor Sen, law is not the source of human rights 
and therefore human rights should not be defined narrowly in legal 
terms.12  Moral obligations to promote and protect human rights must 
therefore go beyond the law.  As a result, law cannot be a guide to 
moral obligations.   
At one level, I agree with Professor Sen.  Law is not the source of 
moral norms, and human rights are no different in this respect than 
any other subject of law.  In fact, in every field of law, the 
normativity that sustains law comes from outside of law, which 
never reaches all the way out to embrace the full spectrum of 
normative concern.  Domestic tort law does not exhaust our 
normative obligations to each other.  Family law does not exhaust the 
normative obligations that exist among family members.  Law is 
always partial with respect to the normative field that it inhabits.  
Law may trumpet the most important and shared elements of that 
common moral field, but law does not exhaust the moral sources that 
bring it into being.   
 
 12. See Amartya Sen, Grotius Lecture before the American University: The 
Global Status of Human Rights (Mar. 23, 2011), in 27 AM. U. INT‘L. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2011) [hereinafter Grotius Lecture] (―We need to see global human rights, I would 
argue, over a much bigger arena, of which legal motivation, actual legislation and 
judicial enforcement form only one part.‖). In arguing this, he rejected the association 
that Bentham made between real law and real rights).  Id. at 5-6. 
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Criminal law is perhaps the best example.  Criminal law only 
picks out some of the offenses that violate the basic principles of a 
community.  Like Professor Sen‘s example of the wife who has a 
right to be consulted in family decisions and who cannot (and who 
should not be able to) call upon law to enforce this right,13 the world 
outside criminal law is full of important principles that, when 
violated to the outrage of many, nonetheless should not be brought 
under criminal prohibition.  For example, cheating on a university 
examination might get someone thrown out of a university, but it 
generally does not come with criminal sanctions.  [KLS:  As a 
colleague pointed out, this sounds like I approve the criminalization 
of these things, so I would like to omit these examples.]  Criminal 
law only covers part of a general moral field.   
The fact that any particular area of law fails to cover some actions 
that may justly deserve moral condemnation is not an argument 
against having law cover those morally wrong actions that are within 
its purview.  Law does not have to cover the whole scope of moral 
outrage to nonetheless be normatively justified over the range that it 
does have.  Law, therefore, can be an important device for ensuring 
the realization of moral norms even if it cannot, and should not, 
cover all moral norms.  In fact, law may well be wise to be 
selective—which makes it no less important.   
Unfortunately, Professor Sen concludes from his correct 
observation that normatively justifiable rights often exceed legal 
protection, which means that one might usefully fight for human 
rights by leaving law largely aside.14  But because the law does not 
underwrite moral obligations, it does not follow that law cannot 
therefore be a central pillar of support in realizing the moral 
obligations we do have.  While Professor Sen acknowledges that law 
 
 13. See id. at 9 ( discussing that women have a moral right, even in traditional 
male dominated societies, to take part in family decisions but noting that ―coercive‖ or 
punitive legislation may be ―too blunt‖ an instrument to ensure that husbands consult 
their wives in family decisions). 
 14. See id. at 9 (―Would it be reasonable to claim that if a human right is seen as 
important, then it must be ideal to legislate it into a precisely specified legal right?  I 
will resist this proposal.  For some rights, the ideal route may well not be legislation, 
but something else, such as recognition or agitation, or even public discussion and 
education, with the hope to changeing the behavior of those who contribute to the 
violation of human rights.‖). 
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may be helpful in some circumstances, one cannot help but be struck 
by the way he moves away from law as quickly as possible to show 
that human rights may develop perfectly well outside a legal 
framework.15  But he may be thinking too narrowly about what law 
might do to encourage this development.   
To see why, let‘s take his example of the importance of 
consultation within a marriage, where it is important for husbands to 
recognize the moral right of a wife to be consulted in making key 
decisions about family matters.  Professor Sen argues that this 
obligation does not spring from a legal duty, and enforcing this 
obligation at law would be useless and even counterproductive.16  
One can easily imagine the nightmarish State that would eavesdrop 
on marriages and intervene in domestic arguments at the point where 
mutual respect lags.  Law has its limits.   
Even with its limitations, law is not irrelevant to this discussion.  
Perhaps the woman‘s moral right to be consulted by her husband is 
more likely to be realized in practice where there is a broader web of 
legal obligations that gives her legally protectable rights outside the 
context where her moral right exists.  If a woman is given moral 
weight and social standing through having legal rights—to human 
dignity, bodily autonomy, property, and more—then her moral right 
to be consulted within a marriage may be more likely to be 
recognized.  And that will be true even though it would be hard for 
the law to recognize her right to be consulted directly.  Perhaps 
having equal employment opportunities or the right to vote—
enforceable by law—would give her a sense that she is not defined 
completely by her marriage, and having these other legal 
entitlements would leverage her claim that she should be taken as an 
equal in the home.  Laws about the marriage relationship itself may 
help to strengthen her moral right to consultation as well.  Laws 
against domestic violence may give her physical protection when she 
asserts her moral rights within marriage.  Laws that do not 
automatically give custody of the children to the husband in a 
 
 15. See id. at 8 (―It is easy to appreciate that if human rights are seen as 
powerful moral claims - indeed as ‗moral rights‘ (to use Hart's phrase) - then surely 
we have reason for some catholicity in considering different avenues for promoting 
these claims.  Thus the ways and means of advancing the ethics of human rights 
need not be confined only to making new laws.‖). 
 16. Id. at 9. 
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divorce may give her more power within the marriage to bargain for 
recognition of her claims.  Laws that give her the right to leave her 
marriage may be crucial as well. 
The obligation that underwrites a woman‘s moral right to be 
consulted stems from a basic principle of the basic moral equal worth 
of persons.  And even though the principle may not originate with 
law, there are many ways that law can sustain a commitment to this 
principle.  Would a woman be likely to be consulted by her husband 
absent a broader legal recognition of her value and equality?  There 
are some respectful husbands who would consult in any event, 
regardless of whether the woman had a legally recognized right or 
not.  But recalcitrant husbands may need pressure from multiple 
sides before they recognize women‘s moral rights to consultation.  
Even if there are no laws requiring consultation, laws ensuring a 
woman‘s equality outside marriage can empower a woman to ask 
that her moral rights within the marriage be respected.  In fact, as 
Jeremy Waldron has noted, legal protections of basic rights may 
create the preconditions for people to take risks by entering 
marriages in the first place.17  If all parties have legal rights 
independent of marriage as well as equal legal rights to leave 
marriages, then relations within marriage may be more equal. 
While I agree with Professor Sen that law is not the source of 
human rights, nor does it exhaust the limits of human rights, law can 
often contribute a great deal toward providing a context within which 
these non-legal rights may be respected in practice.  Law, therefore, 
may be important in more ways than Professor Sen realizes.  Law 
might provide moral support, so to speak, for moral obligations that 
go beyond the law.   
II.  
Professor Sen tells us that law deals in what Kant would call 
―perfect obligations‖18 while human rights involve a great many 
 
 17. See Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for 
Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 625, 628-29 (1988) (positing that legal rights 
provide security and a basis for negotiation for married individuals when mutual 
affection wavers). 
 18. See Immanuel Kant, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF 
MORALS 39 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1949) (1785), available at http://evans-
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―imperfect obligations‖ that are harder for the law to regulate.19  As a 
result, law goes only part of the way toward ensuring the realization 
of human rights. 
The difference between perfect and imperfect obligations can be 
seen in Professor Sen‘s example of torture.  When a person has a 
right not to be tortured, this imposes a ―perfect obligation‖ on 
another person not to engage in the prohibited conduct toward her – 
at all and ever.  But the right not to be tortured also triggers 
―imperfect obligations‖ for others to do what they can to stop torture 
from occurring wherever and whenever it may arise.  ―Doing what 
one can‖ will depend on who particular people are and what their 
capabilities may be.  Someone at the top of a ministry may be able to 
do more to prevent torture than can the fellow prisoner of the 
potential torture victim because the minister can give more effective 
orders and punish those who fail to follow them.  Perhaps not all 
ministers can do this; those who serve in governments under which 
they would be executed for interfering with torture policy do not 
have this leeway.  One needs a great deal of detailed information to 
work out what someone can be expected to do to realize imperfect 
obligations.  
Specifying all of the features that might cause imperfect 
obligations to apply in a concrete situation will be a complex and 
detailed – and perhaps even hopeless – task.  That is why Professor 
Sen believes that the law will never be able to regulate imperfect 
obligations very well.  Because these obligations cannot be specified 
precisely enough in advance, the law may be too blunt an instrument 
for conveying the subtlety of complex moral situations.20  Therefore, 
Professor Sen argues, law will always shortchange the power of 
human rights.  
 
experientialism.freewebspace.com/kant_groundwork_metaphysics_morals01.htm  
(explaining that ―perfect duties‖ are those obligations from which there can be no 
exceptions). 
 19. See Grotius Lecture, supra note 13, at 10-11. 
 20. See id. at 10 (―It is important to emphasize that the recognition of human 
rights is not an insistence that everyone everywhere must rise to help prevent every 
violation of every human right no matter where it occurs.  It is, rather, an 
acknowledgement that if one is in a plausible position to do something effective in 
preventing the violation of such a right, then one does have an obligation to 
consider doing just that.‖).  Sen implies that the law cannot be so subtle as to 
anticipate every situation that might bear on the imperative to act. 
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But here, too, law may be better than Professor Sen thinks at 
working out what imperfect obligations may require and pushing 
legal actors to attempt to realize as full a conception of human rights 
as they reasonably can.  That is because law takes a great many more 
forms than a simple command to an individual to do or refrain from 
doing something.  For example, while it may be tricky to define 
imperfect obligations of individuals because such positive 
obligations can quickly interfere with protected freedoms, it is less 
difficult to define imperfect obligations of states which themselves 
have no moral freedom to assert in response.21  In fact, state officials 
are quite legitimately restricted to act or refrain from acting in all 
sorts of ways that would be illegitimate if those same restrictions 
were put on ordinary individuals.  States may be barred from 
discrimination in contexts where individuals are free to decide on 
whatever basis they like.  For example, a state violates human rights 
when it enforces a ban on cross-racial or same-sex marriage, while 
an individual who chooses a mate based in part on the mate‘s race 
and sex cannot be accused of human-rights-violating discrimination.  
Alternatively, a state may be required to treat people as innocent 
until they are proven guilty in all public settings, while a mother 
choosing a nanny for her child does not morally have to reject 
unconfirmed rumors as a basis for her choice.  Especially when it 
comes to enforcing complex imperfect obligations, states may be a 
better target for legal tutelage than individuals.   
Nowhere is this more evident than with respect to social rights, 
rights for which Professor Sen has passionately argued in The Idea of 
Justice and elsewhere.22  While the United States is not known for its 
social rights at the federal constitutional level,23 many other countries 
have embedded social rights in their domestic constitutions. How 
 
 21. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW ch. 3 (1990) (discussing how state 
officials may come to have different and denser obligations to act in particular 
ways than might ordinary citizens). 
 22. See SEN, IDEA OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 379-84. See generally 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); Amartya Sen, Foreword to 
PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEW 
WAR ON THE POOR, at xi-xvii (2003). 
 23. Emily Zackin has shown in a prize-winning dissertation that social rights 
have had a long history in American state constitutions, however. Emily Zackin, 
Positive Constitutional Rights in the United States 3 (Nov., 2010) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton University). 
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have courts interpreted these constitutional rights? I‘ve recently 
completed a survey of how domestic high courts have dealt with 
cases involving social rights and have come away pleasantly 
surprised at the creativity of courts in promoting realization of the 
imperfect obligations that social rights create.24 
The case law is wide-ranging and I cannot summarize most of it 
here, but suffice it to say that courts generally do not say that they 
have no power to interpret and enforce constitutional clauses in the 
area of rights to education, housing, minimum income, and health 
care on the grounds that these are human rights with too many 
imperfect obligations, although they are.  In a few cases, most 
notably in Latin American high courts, judges actually provide as a 
remedy precisely what the petitioner seeks (particularly access to 
medical treatments or specific drugs where the national health 
service has rejected a doctor‘s request).25  But more often, courts try 
to craft a less direct strategy that encourages the realization of 
imperfect obligations, a strategy that does not consist of bright-line 
rules, but instead develops contextual approaches that focus on 
requiring the state to do what it can to improve the lives of those 
whose rights are at stake.   
In considering how to enforce social rights, for example, courts 
often say that a state may not deprive someone of a social right that 
she already possesses.  As a result, a person who already has housing 
may not be thrown out into the streets when a state decides to take 
over the property that the person has occupied. Instead, in those 
cases, the state must provide alternative housing so as not to leave 
 
 24. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Address at the Annual Meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools: Social Rights in Constitutional Courts — 
Strategies of Articulation and Strategies of Enforcement (Jan., 2009). 
 25. See, e.g., Florian F. Hoffmann & Fernando R. N. M. Bentes, Accountability 
for Social and Economic Rights in Brazil, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
132-33 (Varun Gauri & Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008) (recognizing a high level of 
success for individual Brazilian plaintiffs who bring claims for access to medical 
treatment or medicines); Horacio Javier Etchichury, Argentina: Social Rights, 
Thorny Country: Judicial Review of Economic Policies Sponsored by the IFIs, 22 
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 101, 111-15 (2006) (suggesting that Argentinian supreme 
court and lower court decisions promoted their own legitimacy and garnered public 
support by enforcing the right to life and the right to health care by requiring the 
national government to provide medical treatment to vulnerable people). 
28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:1 
the individual worse off.  The Modderklip case of the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal26 and the Olga Tellis case in India27 
provide variants of this approach.  In such cases, the state develops 
new legal obligations to not make the situation of an individual any 
worse off, even if the state had no legal obligation to provide housing 
in the first place.  Legal sanctions can attach to infringement of rights 
even if the underlying right could not be enforced as a first-order 
matter in domestic courts.   
Alternatively, social rights can be used as interpretive guides to 
other constitutional provisions.  Rather than enforce a social right 
directly, national courts sometimes read into the more directly 
enforceable bright-line rights some ―overhang‖ from the social 
rights.  So, for example, some state courts in Germany have found 
that the constitutional right to property includes ―old-age pensions, 
health benefits, and unemployment compensation,‖ enabling people 
to invoke due-process guarantees if the state threatens to remove the 
benefits.28  The 1995 social rights cases of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court did something similar in establishing that 
people who had paid into a state pension and health care fund had 
property rights in the benefits that the funds were supposed to 
provide.29  These rulings allow individuals to use the individual right 
 
 26. See President of S. Afr. v. Modderklip Boerdery Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) at 
44-49 (S. Afr.) (holding that the national government has a constitutional 
obligation to ensure access to housing or land for the homeless). 
 27. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1985) 2 S.C.R. 51, para. 4.2 
(India)(requiring the state to provide housing for pavement and slum dwellers who 
were recorded in a census and whose housing was demolished).  The Olga Tellis 
case has been frequently misunderstood to have required a positive obligation of 
the state to provide housing directly for all those who were affected.  But, as an 
article by Madhav Khosla shows, the Indian Supreme Court only required the 
actual resettlement of those who had been enumerated in the local census and who 
had been given prior promises of housing, while saying only that the government 
should rather than must resettle the rest. Madhav Khosla, Making Social Rights 
Conditional: Lessons from India, 8 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 739, 747 (2010). 
 28. See Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees of Social Welfare in the 
Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 311(1999) ( ―the goal of 
social justice can be viewed as one of the main themes of the new constitutions of 
the eastern states [that were unified with Western Germany at the end of the Cold 
War], and this goal is explicitly proclaimed in the preambles of four of the five 
new constitutions‖).   Quint explains  the decisions of the new state constitutional 
courts in Germany, id. at 315-321). 
 29. See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. 
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of property to enforce their claims to social benefits, a line of defense 
that ensures that affected individuals have a voice and a forum in 
court when state retrenchment occurs. 
Finally, courts interpreting social rights provisions of domestic 
constitutions sometimes construct those social rights as goals that the 
state must show progress in realizing. In fact, domestic courts will 
even use the very language of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to create this framework, 
saying that a state must adopt certain policies to benefit the poor ―to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights.‖30  This approach 
permits courts to honor many of the contextual elements that 
Professor Sen identifies as being characteristic of imperfect 
obligations.  For example, the South African Constitutional Court in 
the famous Grootboom case adopted this approach by instructing the 
state to create a program for the construction of housing for the poor 
as a way of dealing with the difficult issues raised by the 800 
homeless people who had camped out on private land.31  The 
Supreme Court of Venezuela also took this approach when it told the 
state that it had to create a program for increasing the availability of 
drugs to fight HIV/AIDS.32  And the Indian Supreme Court in the 
Gaurav Jain case ordered the Indian state to provide for the 
―empowerment‖ of disadvantaged classes of people so that they 
 
L. REV. 1921, 1946 (2004) (recognizing that because individuals had been required 
to pay into the state system and had been prevented from securing private benefits, 
the individuals had relied upon the state benefits and therefore the state could not 
eliminate those benefits without due notice); see also LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM & GEORG 
BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 323-24 (2000) (citing Alkotmánybírdóság (AB) 
[Constitutional Court] June 30, 1995, 43/1995 (Hung.)) (finding that when 
individuals invested their income into the state social security system, the benefits 
of that system effectively became the individual‘s property and must be protected 
as such). 
 30. United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights art. 2, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 31. See Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 67 para. 99 
(S. Afr.) (holding that the South African Constitution requires the state to create 
and implement a program to ensure peoples‘ right to access of adequate housing). 
 32. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], July 15, 1999, 
Bermudez et al. v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, Case No. 15.789, 
Decision No. 916 (Venez.). 
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could realize their social rights.33  In each of these cases, courts 
examined the social context and determined that the state could do 
more than it was doing to make the lives of many poor people better.  
The court did not order a direct remedy for the individuals who 
brought the cases, but instead told the state that it was not doing 
enough and had to do more for the class of individuals whom the 
petitioners represented. 
Most of the social rights cases either instruct states to set up 
systems to do better than they have been doing or prevent states from 
actively making a current situation worse.  As a result, courts provide 
an ally for those who are disadvantaged because they can encourage 
the realization of certain sorts of imperfect obligations.  In these 
cases, courts evaluate whether states are taking seriously their 
responsibilities to realize social rights, and, if not, then courts can 
push states to do better.  This seems to be precisely the sort of legal 
enforcement of imperfect obligations that Professor Sen believes is 
impossible for law to accomplish. 
The fact that many particular rights cast long shadows of imperfect 
obligations should not by itself be an argument against the use of law 
to bolster these protections.  Courts know how to specify what states 
must do to realize their imperfect obligations – to do as much as they 
can, when they can.  Courts can stay on top of these issues, 
monitoring state compliance with imperfect obligations and giving 
new pushes when the state fails.  Law is far from useless in pushing 
states to realize their imperfect obligations.   
There is much more to be said about this, but the creative 
approaches of domestic high courts in dealing with social rights 
cases might give Professor Sen some hope that law can be a partner 
in his enterprise.  Courts do not just enforce specific—or perfect—
obligations.  Instead, many have been moving toward pressing states 
to achieve the realization of imperfect obligations as well.   
III.   
Professor Sen is a law skeptic because, while he believes that law 
 
 33. Jain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3021 (India) (recognizing that 
social integration and economic empowerment are fundamental rights ensured by 
the Constitution and upheld by the Court and Government). 
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may be one effective route for protecting human rights, he also 
believes that law is not enough to guarantee their full realization.34  
As Professor Sen argues, moral obligations to defend human rights 
go above and beyond legal obligations.35  But in arguing for this, he 
draws a sharp line between legal—that is, legislative—strategies and 
all others.  He seems to believe that all law has to offer is bright-line 
rules.  
But here too, Professor Sen might find that law can provide more 
support for the realization of rights than he thinks.  If law were as 
narrow as Professor Sen believes— limited to legislation and formal 
legal enactment— then one can see his point.  But the shadow of law 
spreads far beyond formal legality.  It exists also outside the legal 
system in the world of organizations built by lawyers and in the 
politics that have grown up around a legal mentality.  While narrow 
legal enforcement of legislatively or constitutionally created rights is 
one important aspect of what law can do to support human rights, a 
constitutional culture may spread far beyond narrow legality to 
create broader support for human rights, even when formal legality 
fails to do so.   
A constitutional culture will create a culture of rights.  One hopes 
this is true in the broader population, but it is very clearly true among 
lawyers.  Throughout many countries, and ever since human rights 
appeared on the horizon of possibility, one sees the prominence of 
legally trained people in the ranks of human rights advocates.  Many 
human rights organizations have been created and staffed by lawyers.  
Even though recent years have seen the rise of a new cadre of experts 
 
 34. See Grotius Lecture, supra note 12, at 9 (―For some rights, the ideal route 
may well not be legislation, but something else, such as recognition or agitation, or 
even public discussion and education, with the hope to change the behaviour of 
those who contribute to the violation of human rights.‖). 
 35. See id. at 8(―Providing inspiration for legislation is certainly one way in 
which the ethical force of human rights have been constructively deployed. . . .  To 
acknowledge that such a connection exists is not the same thing as taking the 
relevance of human rights to lie exclusively is their playing an inspirational or 
justificatory role for actual legislation.  It is important to see that the idea of human 
rights can be, and is – actually, used in several other ways.  It is easy to appreciate that 
if human rights are seen as powerful moral claims - indeed as "moral rights" (to use 
Hart's phrase) - then surely we have reason for some catholicity in considering 
different avenues for promoting these claims.‖). 
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in human rights with other forms of training, lawyers still play an 
important role in most human rights organizations.  For example, 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are both 
organizations whose methods go beyond litigation and yet both have 
been prominently led by lawyers.36 The International Commission of 
Jurists is an important transnational human rights group, run by 
lawyers and judges.37  Lawyers are key players in the international 
debates over compliance with human rights norms.  The human 
rights movement has not been led only by lawyers, but lawyers have 
been very important to the cause.38 
Why are lawyers so prominent in the fight for human rights?  
Research done by the working group led by Terence Halliday, 
Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm Feeley shows why.39  In country after 
 
 36. See, e.g., Human Rights First Charter, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/about-us/human-rights-first-charter/ (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2011) (observing that Human Rights First was formerly named the 
Lawyer‘s Committee for Human Rights); Kenneth Roth, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/bios/kenneth-roth (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (noting that 
Kenneth Roth, the current executive director of Human Rights Watch, is a former 
U.S. federal prosecutor); The Nobel Peace Prize 1977 – Amnesty International, 
NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1977/amnesty 
-history.html(last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (stating that Amnesty International was 
founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer). 
 37. See Overview, INT‘L COMMISSION OF JURISTS, 
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=441&langage=1&myPage=Overview (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2011)(―The International Commission of Jurists is dedicated to the 
primacy, coherence and implementation of international law and principles that 
advance human rights.  What distinguishes the International Commission of Jurists 
(ICJ) is its impartial, objective and authoritative legal approach to the protection 
and promotion of human rights through the rule of law.  The ICJ provides legal 
expertise at both the international and national levels to ensure that developments 
in international law adhere to human rights principles and that international 
standards are implemented at the national level.‖). 
 38. But, as Lucien Karpik has pointed out, summarizing the case studies 
compiled for a book on the role of lawyers in autocratic political systems, lawyers 
are better at defending some rights more than others:   ―Attorneys . . . mobilisize 
themselves only for individual rights.  These rights include mainly freedom of 
speech, of thought, of assembly, security rights, property rights and the right to 
justice and due process of law.  With some exceptions lawyers have not fought 
outside this universe.‖ Lucien Karpik, Political Lawyers, in FIGHTING FOR 
POLITICAL FREEDOM 463, 465 (Terence C. Halliday et al.  eds., 2007) (emphasis in 
original). 
 39.      See Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Politics Matter: a 
Comparative Theory of Lawyers in the Making of Political Liberalism, in 
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country, and over centuries, legally trained people have fought for 
political liberalism, democracy, justice, rule of law, and human 
rights.  Even in authoritarian regimes, those who have been trained in 
law are often central to domestic human rights struggles, often by 
creating and maintaining autonomous courts that may provide relief 
from the worst repression.40  As Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley wrote: 
It is well known that the foundations of [political liberalism] were laid 
down in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by European states and in 
North America.  It is less well known that lawyers frequently marched at 
the vanguard of these movements toward political liberalism.  Historical 
and sociological studies demonstrate that legal professions often were 
active builders of the institutions of liberal politics.  In a variety of ways, 
legal professions sought the moderation of state power via judicial 
independence, the creation and mobilization of a politically engaged civil 
society, and the vesting of rights in subjects as citizens who would be 
protected by judiciaries.41 
In addition to the case studies that Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley 
mobilized for their volumes that show how lawyers have often been 
crucial to establishing a government based on respect for rights, there 
are other examples.   
In 1930s Hungary, for example, anti-Semitism became state policy 
and the professions were ordered to comply, but the professions split 
in their responses.  When Law XV of 1938 explicitly limited to 20 
 
LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM 56-60 (Terence C. 
Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997) (reviewing the historic role that lawyers in 
several European countries and the United States have played in securing civil and 
political rights, in substance and in procedure); Karpik, supra note 39, at 463-64 
(discussing the roles that attorneys in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 
the United States have played in transforming authoritarian regimes with liberal 
states). See generally FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 
OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Terence C. Halliday et al. 
eds., 2007) (examining the liberal role of lawyers in illiberal regimes). 
 40. See RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
13-14 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) (suggesting that the ―legal 
complex‖ is essential to keeping the excesses of state power in check, and 
providing examples of where aspects of the ―legal complex‖ may still be judicially 
effective in an authoritarian regime, including in Taiwan where a bar association 
was integral in resisting the KMT political party). 
 41. Terence C. Halliday  et al., The Legal Complex in Struggles for Political 
Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 1 (Terence C. Halliday et al. 
eds., 2007). 
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percent the percentage of Jews in the professions, the only member 
of the cabinet to quit in protest was the Minister of Justice.42  The 
mainline bar organizations simply refused to carry out the law.  
Instead, ―the[se] measures . . . were discretely sabotaged for over 
three years.‖43  The bar openly protested the law, while ―[e]very 
loophole in the legislation was turned into a means of evasion.‖44   
Was this open resistance to mandatory discrimination simply a 
reflection of the fact that the educated elite in general resisted this 
policy? Hardly. In fact, the role of other highly educated professions 
makes it clear that education alone did not produce resistance to 
infringement of rights.  The engineers association largely kept quiet, 
though engineers engaged in a silent mathematical protest. They kept 
their Jewish members on board by simply increasing the number of 
Christian clerical staff so that the 20 percent was calculated over a 
larger denominator.45  The doctors, however, not only flocked in 
greater numbers to the overtly anti-Semitic professional association, 
but took matters into their own hands to disqualify many of their 
Jewish colleagues from practice.  When Hungary entered World War 
II in 1941, the doctor‘s association helpfully provided to the Ministry 
of Defense a list of all of the Jewish doctors who remained in 
practice so that they could be assigned to physical labor service.46  
Among these three highly educated groups in inter-war Hungary, 
only the lawyers stood out by publicly protesting the discriminatory 
measures.  Only legal education created professionals who felt that it 
was their special responsibility to fight for rights. 
Professor Sen rightly notes that the moral obligation to defend 
 
 42. See MÁRIA KOVÁCS, LIBERAL PROFESSIONS AND ILLIBERAL POLITICS: 
HUNGARY FROM THE HABSBURGS TO THE HOLOCAUST 103, 107 (1994) (citing the 
Minister of Justice‘s resignation letter in which the Minster explains that the 
discriminatory laws sought to expropriate others‘ wealth, rather than building 
Hungarian society through work). 
 43. Id. at 106. 
 44. Id. at 107-08. 
 45. See id. at 114-15 (stating that the new positions went to ―arch-Christian‖ 
hires, but that they often did little more than collect a paycheck while the Jewish 
engineers handled the workload). 
 46. See id. at 119-20 (noting that an anti-Semitic, anti-welfare medical 
organization also infiltrated the Chamber of Doctors and systematically 
disqualified Jewish doctors, so that only 6 percent of the board remained Jewish, as 
required by law). 
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human rights goes beyond narrow legal obligations.  But, empirically 
speaking, those who have been trained in law are more likely to take 
personal risks to fight for rights, even when the formal law pulls in a 
different direction.  Formal law can, and in autocratic and 
discriminatory societies generally does, pull in directions that 
compromise rights.  But lawyers have been been able to tell the 
difference between law that infringes rights and law that bolsters 
rights.  Where formal law orders rights violations, lawyers are often 
in the front lines of protest. 
So, while law is not enough to provide a full and guaranteed 
defense of human rights, I would counsel Professor Sen to regard 
lawyers as some of his best allies in his fight. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Professor Sen‘s body of work on the importance of human rights 
should be an inspiration to all of us.  His Grotius Lecture brings to an 
audience of international lawyers some of the key elements of his 
defense of human rights.  In this lecture, we can see his abiding sense 
that we all are obligated to do what we can to improve the lives of 
the millions—even billions—of people for whom the promise of 
human rights has not yet been realized.  In honor of this year‘s 
Grotius Lecture, we should all recommit ourselves to the fight for 
human rights.  Judging from the sheer number of people in the room 
and the enthusiasm with which Professor Sen‘s lecture has been 
greeted, I can see the Professor Sen‘s words have had their intended 
effect.   
My remarks are designed to ensure that Professor Sen realizes that 
a giant ballroom full of international lawyers is the most supportive 
audience he can imagine, and that law is a better ally in his life‘s 
work than he knows.  I hope Professor Sen‘s appearance at the 
meetings of the American Society for International Law will 
convince him that he can count on international lawyers as his allies.   
 
